The Limits of Affective Interventions: Intergroup Emotions and Undemocratic Attitudes (with Markus Wagner)
Under Review at American Journal of Political Science
Does affective depolarization reduce support for undemocratic practices? We argue that research testing this should (1) move beyond unidimensional affect measures and capture intergroup emotions, and (2) focus on those with the strongest out-partisan animus. We field a preregistered experiment (N = 2,500) in the U.S., adapting existing economic-game interventions to reduce out-partisan animus while measuring multiple negative intergroup emotions as well as othering, aversion, and moralization. The intervention reliably lowers negative emotions and increases respect and trust, with the largest affective shifts among respondents highest in initial hate, anger, and contempt. The treatment also increases interpersonal tolerance toward out-partisans. Yet, this does not translate into lower support for undemocratic practices or weaker illiberal attitudes, including among high-animus respondents. These results indicate that affective interventions, even when they move relevant intergroup emotions, are unlikely to strengthen democratic commitments, implying that researchers need to look elsewhere to effectively shift democratic support.
From Leader Profiles to Voter Perceptions: Sociodemographic and Policy Cues (with Isabella Rebasso and Markus Wagner)
Under Review at the British Journal of Political Science
Full draft is available.
Redacted for peer review.
What Drives Affective Polarization? Real-World Evidence of Ideological and Identitarian Roots of Affective Polarization (R&R at Political Behavior)
Does elite ideological polarization increase mass affective polarization? I study this question with a real-world sudden increase in elite polarization in the United Kingdom resulting from (1) the Labour Party’s sudden leftward shift in 2015 under a new leader, and (2) the Conservative Party’s sudden change in Brexit policy following the 2016 referendum. Using panel data, I find that ideological elite polarization heightens affective polarization among citizens, particularly among non-partisans, providing evidence that affective polarization is also rooted in ideology. Importantly, among partisans, in-party enthusiasm drives the changes in affective polarization more than out-party hostility. Lastly, I show that the causal direction between how citizens perceive elite ideological polarization and how affectively polarized they are is bidirectional, suggesting that while some levels of affective polarization are inherent in democracies, affective polarization can, to a certain extent, be tamed by moderate position-taking by parties. These results carry important implications for the study of affective polarization across democracies.